Abstract:
Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communication are described that support security key derivation for handover. A network entity (e.g., an access and mobility function (AMF)) may establish an access stratum (AS) key to ensure secure communications between a user equipment (UE) and a base station. If the UE relocates to a new network entity (e.g., target network entity), the initial network entity (e.g., source network entity) may perform a handover procedure to the target network entity. In some aspects, the network entities may derive a unified AS key for the handover procedure. Additionally, the network entities may utilize one or more intermediate keys (e.g., refreshed intermediate keys) derived from, in part, respective freshness parameters for the handover procedure. The target network entity may then utilize the derived intermediate keys to derive the AS key for the handover procedure and establish communications with the UE.
Abstract:
Methods, systems, and devices for device-to-device (D2D) wireless communication are disclosed. In an embodiment, a method includes receiving a timing variable and a timing offset allowance from a network at a device, the timing variable being received while the device is in a connected mode. The device may then use the timing variable and the timing offset for D2D discovery message authentication by comparing the timing variable with a local timing variable to determine whether a difference between the two variables is within the timing offset allowance. Embodiments of the disclosure may enhance the security of devices participating in D2D discovery communications.
Abstract:
In order to mitigate the security risk posed by the insertion of a relay node within a communication network, both device authentication and subscriber authentication are performed on the relay node. Device and subscriber authentication may be bound together so that a relay node is granted access to operate within the network only if both device and subscriber authentication are successful. Additionally, a communication network (or authentication node) may further verify that a subscriber identifier (received as part of subscriber authentication) is associated with the corresponding device type (identified by the device identifier in the corresponding device authentication) as part of the subscriber authentication process.
Abstract:
In order to mitigate the security risk posed by the insertion of a relay node within a communication network, both device authentication and subscriber authentication are performed on the relay node. Device and subscriber authentication may be bound together so that a relay node is granted access to operate within the network only if both device and subscriber authentication are successful. Additionally, a communication network (or authentication node) may further verify that a subscriber identifier (received as part of subscriber authentication) is associated with the corresponding device type (identified by the device identifier in the corresponding device authentication) as part of the subscriber authentication process.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus for protecting user privacy in a shared key system. According to one aspect, a user generates a derived identity based on a key and a session variable, and sends the derived identity to an application. In one embodiment, a key server may be used to receive the derived identity from the application, and return a sub-key to the application to use for encrypting communications with the user.
Abstract:
Prior to transmission, a message is divided into multiple transmission units. A sub-message authentication code is obtained for each of the transmission units. A composed message authentication code is obtained for the whole message based on the sub-message authentication codes of the multiple transmission units. The multiple transmission units and the composed message authentication code are then transmitted. A receiver of the message receives a plurality of transmission units corresponding to the message. A local sub-message authentication code is calculated by the receiver for each transmission unit. A local composed message authentication code is calculated by the receiver based on the local sub-message authentication codes for the plurality of transmission units. The local composed message authentication code is compared to a received composed message authentication code to determine the integrity and/or authenticity of the received message.
Abstract:
Systems and methodologies are described that facilitate fetching a native security context between network nodes in a core network after an inter-system handover of a mobile device. For instance, a mobility message that is integrity protected by a security context (e.g., the native security context, a mapped security context,..) can be obtained at a network node from the mobile device. Further, the network node can send a request to a disparate network node within a core network. The request can include information that can be used by the disparate network node to establish that the mobile device is authenticated. Moreover, the native security context can be received from the disparate network node in response to the request. Accordingly, the native security context need not be recreated between the network node and the mobile device.
Abstract:
Systems and methodologies are described that facilitate fetching a native security context between network nodes in a core network after an inter-system handover of a mobile device. For instance, a mobility message that is integrity protected by a security context (e.g., the native security context, a mapped security context,..) can be obtained at a network node from the mobile device. Further, the network node can send a request to a disparate network node within a core network. The request can include information that can be used by the disparate network node to establish that the mobile device is authenticated. Moreover, the native security context can be received from the disparate network node in response to the request. Accordingly, the native security context need not be recreated between the network node and the mobile device.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus for protecting user privacy in a shared key system (100). According to one aspect, a user (114) generates a derived identity (108) based on a key (102) and a session variable, and sends the derived identity to an application (116). In one embondiment, a key server (126) may be used to receive the derived identity from the application, and return a sub-key (138) to the application to use for encrypting communications with the user.