Secure bootstrapping for wireless communications

    公开(公告)号:AU2006210510C1

    公开(公告)日:2010-09-16

    申请号:AU2006210510

    申请日:2006-02-03

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: A mutual authentication method is provided for securely agreeing application-security keys with mobile terminals supporting legacy Subscriber Identity Modules (e.g., GSM SIM and CDMA2000 R-UIM, which do not support 3G AKA mechanisms). A challenge-response key exchange is implemented between a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and mobile terminal (MT). The BSF generates an authentication challenge and sends it to the MT under a server-authenticated public key mechanism. The MT receives the challenge and determines whether it originates from the BSF based on a bootstrapping server certificate. The MT formulates a response to the authentication challenge based on keys derived from the authentication challenge and a pre-shared secret key. The BSF receives the authentication response and verifies whether it originates from the MT. Once verified, the BSF and MT independently calculate an application security key that the BSF sends to a requesting network application function to establish secure communications with the MT.

    Secure bootstrapping for wireless communications

    公开(公告)号:AU2006210510B2

    公开(公告)日:2010-05-13

    申请号:AU2006210510

    申请日:2006-02-03

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: A mutual authentication method is provided for securely agreeing application-security keys with mobile terminals supporting legacy Subscriber Identity Modules (e.g., GSM SIM and CDMA2000 R-UIM, which do not support 3G AKA mechanisms). A challenge-response key exchange is implemented between a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and mobile terminal (MT). The BSF generates an authentication challenge and sends it to the MT under a server-authenticated public key mechanism. The MT receives the challenge and determines whether it originates from the BSF based on a bootstrapping server certificate. The MT formulates a response to the authentication challenge based on keys derived from the authentication challenge and a pre-shared secret key. The BSF receives the authentication response and verifies whether it originates from the MT. Once verified, the BSF and MT independently calculate an application security key that the BSF sends to a requesting network application function to establish secure communications with the MT.

    33.
    发明专利
    未知

    公开(公告)号:BRPI0519544A2

    公开(公告)日:2009-02-17

    申请号:BRPI0519544

    申请日:2005-12-21

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: Embodiments describe techniques in connection with configuring a firewall and/or reducing network traffic. According to an embodiment is a method for configuring a firewall to reduce unwanted network traffic. The method includes executing a web-server and detecting a passive socket has been created. The method also includes establishing contact with a firewall and requesting the firewall to permit flows directed to the passive socket. According to some embodiments, the method can include closing the web-server and destroying the passive socket. The firewall can be contacted with the destroyed passive socket information and can be sent a request to deny flows directed to the destroyed passive socket. If the passive socket is closed, the method can automatically revoke the request to the firewall to permit flows directed to the passive socket.

    SYNCHRONIZATION TEST FOR DEVICE AUTHENTICATION

    公开(公告)号:CA2685427A1

    公开(公告)日:2008-10-02

    申请号:CA2685427

    申请日:2008-03-27

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: Device authentication is based on the ability of a human to synchronize t he movements of his or her fingers. A pairing procedure for two wireless dev ices may thus involve a synchronization test that is based on the relative t iming of actuations of input devices on each of the wireless devices. In som e aspects a synchronization test involves determining whether actuations of user input devices on two different wireless devices occurred within a defin ed time interval. In some aspects a synchronization test involves comparing time intervals defined by multiple actuations of user input devices on two w ireless devices.

    SECURE BOOTSTRAPPING FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

    公开(公告)号:HK1112124A1

    公开(公告)日:2008-08-22

    申请号:HK08106747

    申请日:2008-06-18

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: A mutual authentication method is provided for securely agreeing application-security keys with mobile terminals supporting legacy Subscriber Identity Modules (e.g., GSM SIM and CDMA2000 R-UIM, which do not support 3G AKA mechanisms). A challenge-response key exchange is implemented between a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and mobile terminal (MT). The BSF generates an authentication challenge and sends it to the MT under a server-authenticated public key mechanism. The MT receives the challenge and determines whether it originates from the BSF based on a bootstrapping server certificate. The MT formulates a response to the authentication challenge based on keys derived from the authentication challenge and a pre-shared secret key. The BSF receives the authentication response and verifies whether it originates from the MT. Once verified, the BSF and MT independently calculate an application security key that the BSF sends to a requesting network application function to establish secure communications with the MT.

    INICIO SEGURO PARA COMUNICACIONES INALAMBRICAS.

    公开(公告)号:MX2007009475A

    公开(公告)日:2007-10-16

    申请号:MX2007009475

    申请日:2006-02-03

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: Se proporciona un metodo de autentificacion mutua para acordar de manera segura claves de segurida de aplicacion con terminales moviles que soportan Modulos de Identidad de Abonado heredados (por ejemplo, GSM SIM y CDMA2000 R-UIM, los cuales no soportan mecanismos 3G AKA). Se implementa un intercambio de clave de desafio-respuesta entre una funcion del servidor de inicio o programa (BSF) y la terminal movil (MT). La BSF genera un desafio de autentificacion y envia este a la MT bajo un mecanismo de clave publica autentificada por el servidor. La MT recibe el desafio y determina si se origina de la BSF sobre la base de un certificado del servidor de inicio o arranque. La MT formula una respuesta al desafio de autentificacion sobre la base de claves derivadas del desafio de autentificacion y una clave secreta previamente compartida. La BSF recibe la respuesta de autentificacion y verifica si se origina de la MT. Una vez verificada, la BSF y la MT calculan independientemente una clave de seguridad de aplicacion que la BSF envia a una funcion de aplicacion de red solicitante para establecer comunicaciones seguras con la MT.

    SMALL PUBLIC-KEY BASED DIGITAL SIGNATURES FOR AUTHENTICATION

    公开(公告)号:CA2598811A1

    公开(公告)日:2006-08-31

    申请号:CA2598811

    申请日:2006-02-24

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: Embodiments disclosed allow authentication between two entities having agreed on the use of a common modulus N. The authentication includes generating a pseudorandom string value; generating a public key value based on the modulus N and the pseudorandom string value; generating a private key value corresponding to the public key value; receiving a verifier's public key value; generating a shared secret value based on the modulus N, the private key value and the verifier's public key value; calculating an authentication signature value using the shared secret value; and transmitting the authentication signature value for authentication. When the authentication signature is received, the public key value and the shared value are generated to calculate an authentication signature value. Thereafter, the authentication signature values are compared and authenticated.

    Small public-key based digital signatures for authentication

    公开(公告)号:AU2006216517A1

    公开(公告)日:2006-08-31

    申请号:AU2006216517

    申请日:2006-02-24

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: Embodiments disclosed allow authentication between two entities having agreed on the use of a common modulus N. The authentication includes generating a pseudorandom string value; generating a public key value based on the modulus N and the pseudorandom string value; generating a private key value corresponding to the public key value; receiving a verifier's public key value; generating a shared secret value based on the modulus N, the private key value and the verifier's public key value; calculating an authentication signature value using the shared secret value; and transmitting the authentication signature value for authentication. When the authentication signature is received, the public key value and the shared value are generated to calculate an authentication signature value. Thereafter, the authentication signature values are compared and authenticated.

    Secure bootstrapping for wireless communications

    公开(公告)号:AU2006210510A1

    公开(公告)日:2006-08-10

    申请号:AU2006210510

    申请日:2006-02-03

    Applicant: QUALCOMM INC

    Abstract: A mutual authentication method is provided for securely agreeing application-security keys with mobile terminals supporting legacy Subscriber Identity Modules (e.g., GSM SIM and CDMA2000 R-UIM, which do not support 3G AKA mechanisms). A challenge-response key exchange is implemented between a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and mobile terminal (MT). The BSF generates an authentication challenge and sends it to the MT under a server-authenticated public key mechanism. The MT receives the challenge and determines whether it originates from the BSF based on a bootstrapping server certificate. The MT formulates a response to the authentication challenge based on keys derived from the authentication challenge and a pre-shared secret key. The BSF receives the authentication response and verifies whether it originates from the MT. Once verified, the BSF and MT independently calculate an application security key that the BSF sends to a requesting network application function to establish secure communications with the MT.

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