Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide multisigning-protocol for robust multiple party digital signatures. SOLUTION: Embodiments describe a system and/or method for multiple party digital signatures. According to a first aspect, the method includes: establishing a first validity range for a first key; establishing a first validity range for at least a second key; and determining if the validity range of the first key overlaps the first validity range of at least the second key. A certificate is signed with the first validity range of the first key and the first validity range of at least the second key if the validity ranges overlap. According to another embodiment, signage of the certificate is refused if the first validity range of the first key does not overlap with the first validity range of at least the second key. COPYRIGHT: (C)2011,JPO&INPIT
Abstract:
Device authentication is based on the ability of a human to synchronize the movements of his or her fingers. A pairing procedure for two wireless devices may thus involve a synchronization test that is based on the relative timing of actuations of input devices on each of the wireless devices. In some aspects a synchronization test involves determining whether actuations of user input devices on two different wireless devices occurred within a defined time interval. In some aspects a synchronization test involves comparing time intervals defined by multiple actuations of user input devices on two wireless devices.
Abstract:
Prior to transmission, a message is divided into multiple transmission units. A sub-message authentication code is obtained for each of the transmission units. A composed message authentication code is obtained for the whole message based on the sub-message authentication codes of the multiple transmission units. The multiple transmission units and the composed message authentication code are then transmitted. A receiver of the message receives a plurality of transmission units corresponding to the message. A local sub-message authentication code is calculated by the receiver for each transmission unit. A local composed message authentication code is calculated by the receiver based on the local sub-message authentication codes for the plurality of transmission units. The local composed message authentication code is compared to a received composed message authentication code to determine the integrity and/or authenticity of the received message.
Abstract:
A communications system and method of bootstrapping mobile station authentication and establishing a secure encryption key are disclosed. In one embodiment of the communications network, a distinguished random challenge is reserved for generation of a secure encryption key, wherein the distinguished random challenge is not used for authentication of a mobile station. The distinguished random challenge is stored at a mobile station's mobile equipment and used to generate a secure encryption key, and a bootstrapping function in the network uses a normal random challenge to authenticate the mobile station and the distinguished random challenge to generate the secure encryption key.
Abstract:
Las modalidades descritas permiten la autenticacion entre dos entidades que han acordado el uso de un modulo comun N; la autenticacion comprende generar de un valor de secuencia pseudo aleatorio, generar un valor de clave publica basado en el modulo N y el valor de secuencia seudo-aleatorio; generar un valor de clave privada correspondiente al valor de clave publica; recibir un valor de clave publica del verificador; y generar un valor secreto compartido con base en los modulos N, el valor de clave privada y el valor de clave publica del verificador; calcular un valor de firma de autenticacion utilizando el valor secreto compartido; y transmitir el valor de firma de autenticacion para autenticacion; cuando la firma de autenticacion es recibida, el valor de clave publica y el valor compartido son generados para calcular un valor de firma de autenticacion; posteriormente, los valores de firma de autenticacion se comparan y autentican.
Abstract:
A mutual authentication method is provided for securely agreeing application-security keys with mobile terminals supporting legacy Subscriber Identity Modules (e.g., GSM SIM and CDMA2000 R-UIM, which do not support 3G AKA mechanisms). A challenge-response key exchange is implemented between a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and mobile terminal (MT). The BSF generates an authentication challenge and sends it to the MT under a server-authenticated public key mechanism. The MT receives the challenge and determines whether it originates from the BSF based on a bootstrapping server certificate. The MT formulates a response to the authentication challenge based on keys derived from the authentication challenge and a pre-shared secret key. The BSF receives the authentication response and verifies whether it originates from the MT. Once verified, the BSF and MT independently calculate an application security key that the BSF sends to a requesting network application function to establish secure communications with the MT.
Abstract:
Efficient transmission of cryptographic information in secure real time protocol. A transmitting terminal may be used to encrypt data with a session key derived from a bit-stream. The bit-stream may be sent with header information to the receiving terminal. To conserve bandwidth, the information may be divided into portions, and each portion transmitted with an encrypted data packet. The receiving terminal may be used to recover the bit-stream from the information portions in the packet headers, and use the bit-stream to derive the session key. The session key may be used to decrypt the data.
Abstract:
A mutual authentication method is provided for securely agreeing application-security keys with mobile terminals supporting legacy Subscriber Identity Modules (e.g., GSM SIM and CDMA2000 R-UIM, which do not support 3G AKA mechanisms). A challenge-response key exchange is implemented between a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and mobile terminal (MT). The BSF generates an authentication challenge and sends it to the MT under a server-authenticated public key mechanism. The MT receives the challenge and determines whether it originates from the BSF based on a bootstrapping server certificate. The MT formulates a response to the authentication challenge based on keys derived from the authentication challenge and a pre-shared secret key. The BSF receives the authentication response and verifies whether it originates from the MT. Once verified, the BSF and MT independently calculate an application security key that the BSF sends to a requesting network application function to establish secure communications with the MT.
Abstract:
Efficient transmission of cryptographic information in secure real time protocol. A transmitting terminal may be used to encrypt data with a session key derived from a bit-stream. The bit-stream may be sent with header information to the receiving terminal. To conserve bandwidth, the information may be divided into portions, and each portion transmitted with an encrypted data packet. The receiving terminal may be used to recover the bit-stream from the information portions in the packet headers, and use the bit-stream to derive the session key. The session key may be used to decrypt the data.