Abstract:
Apparatuses, systems, and methods to perform attachment of a wireless device to a next generation gateway via either a base station of a next generation radio access network (RAN) or a mobility management entity of a legacy RAN. An apparatus may be configured to receive an attachment request from a wireless device, determine authentication information via communication with a home subscriber server, determine, based at least in part on the authentication information, whether the wireless device is capable of communicating via the next generation RAT, and send, in response to determining the wireless device is capable, a connection request to a gateway of the next generation RAN. The authentication information may include subscription information associated with the wireless device.
Abstract:
A user equipment (UE) includes first and second subscriber identity modules (SIMs), possibly subscribed to different carriers. When the first SIM is in a connected state and the second SIM is in an idle state, the UE may need to periodically tune away a radio from a first frequency used for communication under the first SIM to a second frequency used for idle mode activity under the second SIM. The UE may provide to the network of the first SIM the second SIM's traffic activity pattern and/or serving frequency so that the network may provide coordinated configuration and/or scheduling for the UE device, e.g., in order to make the action of tuning away (and tuning back) the radio more efficient and/or to decrease the network impact of such radio tune aways (e.g., to decrease wasted uplink scheduling and wasted downlink transmissions for the first SIM).
Abstract:
Techniques to protect a subscriber identity, by encrypting a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) to form one-time use subscription concealed identifiers (SUCIs) using a set of one-time ephemeral asymmetric keys, generated by a user equipment (UE), and network provided keys are disclosed. Encryption of the SUPI to form the SUCIs can mitigate snooping by rogue network entities, such as fake base stations. The UE is restricted from providing the unencrypted SUPI over an unauthenticated connection to a network entity. In some instances, the UE uses a trusted symmetric fallback encryption key KFB or trusted asymmetric fallback public key PKFB to verify messages from an unauthenticated network entity and/or to encrypt the SUPI to form a fallback SUCIFB for communication of messages with the unauthenticated network entity.
Abstract:
Apparatuses, systems, and methods to perform attachment of a wireless device to a next generation gateway via either a base station of a next generation radio access network (RAN) or a mobility management entity of a legacy RAN. An apparatus may be configured to receive an attachment request from a wireless device, determine authentication information via communication with a home subscriber server, determine, based at least in part on the authentication information, whether the wireless device is capable of communicating via the next generation RAT, and send, in response to determining the wireless device is capable, a connection request to a gateway of the next generation RAN. The authentication information may include subscription information associated with the wireless device.
Abstract:
Described herein are systems and methods for carrier aggregation deployment and organization in unlicensed bands. A method may comprise scanning, by a transceiver within a base station, channels in a band of interest, reporting, by the transceiver, signal measurement information to the base station, cell searching, by the transceiver, channels in the band of interest, determining channel information for neighboring each channel, and transmitting, by the transceiver, the channel information to the base station.
Abstract:
Techniques to protect a subscriber identity, by encrypting a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) to form one-time use subscription concealed identifiers (SUCIs) using a set of one-time ephemeral asymmetric keys, generated by a user equipment (UE), and network provided keys are disclosed. Encryption of the SUPI to form the SUCIs can mitigate snooping by rogue network entities, such as fake base stations. The UE is restricted from providing the unencrypted SUPI over an unauthenticated connection to a network entity. In some instances, the UE uses a trusted symmetric fallback encryption key K FB or trusted asymmetric fallback public key PK FB to verify messages from an unauthenticated network entity and/or to encrypt the SUPI to form a fallback SUCI FB for communication of messages with the unauthenticated network entity.