Abstract:
A method for tracing traitor receivers in a broadcast encryption system. The method includes using a false key to encode plural subsets representing receivers in the system. The subsets are derived from a tree using a Subset-Cover system, and the traitor receiver is associated with one or more compromised keys that have been obtained by a potentially cloned pirate receiver. Using a clone of the pirate receiver, the identity of the traitor receiver is determined, or the pirate receiver clones are rendered useless for decrypting data using the compromised key by generating an appropriate set of subsets.
Abstract:
A method, system, and computer program product for broadcast encryption key management. The invention eliminates the need for pre-specification of a maximum number of keys that can be employed in a given broadcast encryption system by enabling an initial key to be extended by a link key. New receiver devices are modified to validate the extended keys, while older devices ignore them and process initial keys as usual. Compromised link keys can be revoked, though revocation preferably uses a unique syntax for link key revocation.
Abstract:
A recorder system contains a media key block (MKB) and selectively writes protected content into a recording medium according to the following content protection logic, to combat theft of the protected content: If the medium does not have a MKB, then the recorder writes its stored MKB into the medium and writes protected content into the medium. If the medium has a MKB that is older than the stored MKB in the recorder, then the recorder writes its stored MKB into the medium before re-encrypting and writing protected content into the medium. If the medium has a MKB that is newer than the stored MKB, then the MKB in the medium is used for content protection. The recorder may store the newer MKB in non-volatile memory, effectively updating its previous stored MKB, so the recorder will have the most recently observed MKB for content protection use.
Abstract:
A system, method, and computer program product enabling user devices to authenticate and validate a digital message sent by a distribution centre, without requiring transmissions to the distribution centre. The centre transmits the message with an appended modulus that is the product of two specially selected primes. The transmission includes an appended authentication value based on an original message hash value, a new message hash value, and the modulus. The new message hash value is the centre's public RSA key; a corresponding private RSA key is also computed. Individual user devices combine a digital signet, a public modulus, unique secret numbers, and an original message hash to compute a unique integrity value K. Subsequent messages are similarly processed to determine new integrity values K', which equal K if and only if new messages originated from the centre and have not been corrupted.
Abstract:
A tree is used to partition stateless receivers in a broadcast content encryption system into subsets. Two different methods of partitioning are disclosed. When a set of revoked receivers is identified, the revoked receivers define a relatively small cover of the non-revoked receivers by disjoint subsets. Subset keys associated with the subsets are then used to encrypt a session key that in turn is used to encrypt the broadcast content. Only non-revoked receivers can decrypt the session key and, hence, the content.
Abstract:
A system, method, and computer program product to renewably prevent traitors in a broadcast encryption system from re-using compromised keys. A license agency assigns individual receivers a set of Sequence Keys preferably at manufacture, and assigns Sequence Key Blocks (SKBs) to protected content files to be distributed. The files may be distributed on prerecorded media and typically include several file modifications . The particular modifications in a pirated version of a file can help identify which traitors contributed to its theft. SKBs assigned to new files distributed after traitors have been identified cannot be usefully processed using the compromised keys employed in previous content piracy. Innocent receivers that happen to have compromised key(s) in common with traitors can use a replacement uncompromised Sequence Key from the set to usefully decrypt content. Traitors will however step through all their Sequence Keys without reaching one that will work.
Abstract:
A system, method, and computer program product enabling individual user devices to authenticate and validate a digital message sent by a distribution center, without requiring transmissions to the distribution center. The center transmits the message with an appended modulus that is the product of two specially selected primes. The transmission also includes an appended authentication value that is based on an original message hash value, a new message hash value, and the modulus. The new message hash value is designed to be the center's public RSA key; a corresponding private RSA key is also computed. Individual user devices combine a digital signet, a public modulus, preferably unique hardware-based numbers, and an original message hash to compute a unique integrity value K. Subsequent messages are similarly processed to determine new integrity values K′, which equal K if and only if new messages originated from the center and have not been corrupted.
Abstract:
A tree is used to partition stateless receivers in a broadcast content encryption system into subsets. Two different methods of partitioning are disclosed. When a set of revoked receivers is identified, the revoked receivers define a relatively small cover of the non-revoked receivers by disjoint subsets. Subset keys associated with the subsets are then used to encrypt a session key that in turn is used to encrypt the broadcast content. Only non-revoked receivers can decrypt the session key and, hence, the content.
Abstract:
Un método para prevenir la reutilización de claves comprometidas en un sistema de codificación de emisión, caracterizado por: (a) incorporar un conjunto particular de claves de secuencia asignadas por una agencia de licenciamiento a receptores individuales; (b) asignar un bloque de claves de secuencia (en adelante SKB) por la agencia de licenciamiento al menos a un archivo protegido distribuido; (c) pruebas criptográficas incrementales por los receptores individuales para determinar (200) si una clave de secuencia seleccionada está comprometida; (d1) si la clave de secuencia seleccionada no está comprometida, entonces descodificar adecuadamente en respuesta (202) el archivo y finalizar el método; (d2) si la clave de secuencia seleccionada está comprometida, entonces determinar en respuesta (204) si se dispone de una clave de secuencia subsiguiente del conjunto; (e1) si está disponible una clave de secuencia subsiguiente, entonces seleccionar (206) esa clave de secuencia subsiguiente y volver a la etapa (c); y (e2) si no está disponible una clave de secuencia subsiguiente, entonces el método termina (208) sin descodificar apropiadamente el archivo.
Abstract:
A system, method, and computer program product to renewably prevent traitors in a broadcast encryption system from re-using compromised keys. A license agency assigns individual receivers a set of Sequence Keys preferably at manufacture, and assigns Sequence Key Blocks (SKBs) to protected content files to be distributed. The files may be distributed on prerecorded media and typically include several file modifications. The particular modifications in a pirated version of a file can help identify which traitors contributed to its theft. SKBs assigned to new files distributed after traitors have been identified cannot be usefully processed using the compromised keys employed in previous content piracy. Innocent receivers that happen to have compromised key(s) in common with traitors can use a replacement uncompromised Sequence Key from the set to usefully decrypt content. Traitors will however step through all their Sequence Keys without reaching one that will work.