Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To prevent unauthorized correction on data used during booting and access after booting for reinforcing security of a computer. SOLUTION: In the computer having a reliable platform module TPM, an expected hash value for a boot component can be placed inside a platform configuration register PCR, and consequently, the TPM can disclose a secret. Then, the boot component is decoded by using the secret, and its hash value is calculated to be placed inside the PCR. Subsequently, the comparison of PCRs can be carried out. When the comparison between the PCRs is not carried out, the access to an important secret for system operation can be disabled. The access to a first secret is allowed only when a plurality of first PCR values exist, while the access to a second secret is allowed only after one or a plurality of PCR values are replaced by new values. COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT
Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a mechanism for a protected operating system boot which prevents rogue components from being loaded with an operating system, and thus prevents divulgence of a system key under inappropriate circumstances. SOLUTION: After a portion of a machine startup procedure has occurred, the operating system loader is run, the loader is validated by a validator, and a correct machine state is either verified to exist and/or created. Once the loader has been verified to be a legitimate loader, and the machine state under which it is running is verified to be correct, the loader is carried out. COPYRIGHT: (C)2011,JPO&INPIT
Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To prevent rogue components from being loaded together with an operating system, to prevent divulgence of a system key under inappropriate circumstances. SOLUTION: After a portion of a machine startup procedure has occurred, an operating system loader is run, and the loader is validated, and a correct machine state is either verified to exist and/or to be created. Once the loader has been verified to be a legitimate loader and the machine state under which the loader is running is verified to be correct, a loader's future behavior is known to protect against the loading of rogue components that can cause divulgence of the system key. When the loader's behavior is known to be safe for the system key, a validator unseals the system key and provides it to the loader. COPYRIGHT: (C)2006,JPO&NCIPI
Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a method and a system for preventing a driver from being overwritten by another driver having a subsequent version or a common name. SOLUTION: This method and this system for preventing a driver from being overwritten by another driver having a subsequent version or a common name includes generation of unique identification in all targeted driver packages. Driver files included in the driver packages or all the driver packages themselves are installed in a sub-directory position of a common storage based on the unique identification. The driver files can be loaded to a memory from the sub-directory position. Accordingly, a plurality of the driver packages and the driver files having the same name can be installed and loaded by making them coexist. COPYRIGHT: (C)2005,JPO&NCIPI
Abstract:
A validation technique for ensuring security of a computer operating system during the loading process is described. A validator 550 evaluates the operating system loader 410 for compliance with a known set of standards and also evaluates the state of the machine 502 on which the operating system is loading. Machine validation involves ensuring that the machine 502 is in a state known to be secure following initial loading of the BIOS, option ROMS and boot sector. If validation of the machine and loader is correct key 204 is provided to the loader which in turn will supply it to the operating system for later use.
Abstract:
A mechanism for protected operating system boot that prevents rogue componen ts from being loaded with the operating system, and thus prevents divulgence of the system key under inappropriate circumstances. After a portion of the machine startup procedur e has occurred, the operating system loader is run, the loader is validated, and a correct machi ne state is either verified to exist and/or created. Once the loader has been verified to be a legitimat e loader, and the machine state under which it is running is verified to be correct, the loader's futu re behavior is known to protect against the loading of rogue components that could cause divulgence of the system key. With the loader's behavior being known to be safe for the system key, the validator may unseal the system key and provides it to the loader.
Abstract:
A mechanism for protected operating system boot that prevents rogue components from being loaded with the operating system, and thus prevents divulgence of the system key under inappropriate circumstances. After a portion of the machine startup procedure has occurred, the operating system loader is run, the loader is validated, and a correct machine state is either verified to exist and/or created. Once the loader has been verified to be a legitimate loader, and the machine state under which it is running is verified to be correct, the loader's future behavior is known to protect against the loading of rogue components that could cause divulgence of the system key. With the loader's behavior being known to be safe for the system key, the validator may unseal the system key and provides it to the loader.
Abstract:
A mechanism for protected operating system boot that prevents rogue components from being loaded with the operating system, and thus prevents divulgence of the system key under inappropriate circumstances. After a portion of the machine startup procedure has occurred, the operating system loader is run, the loader is validated, and a correct machine state is either verified to exist and/or created. Once the loader has been verified to be a legitimate loader, and the machine state under which it is running is verified to be correct, the loader's future behavior is known to protect against the loading of rogue components that could cause divulgence of the system key With the loader's behavior being known to be safe for the system key, the validator may unseal the system key and provides it to the loader.
Abstract:
A MECHANISM FOR PROTECTED OPERATING SYSTEM (134) BOOT THAT PREVENTS ROGUE COMPONENTS FROM BEING LOADED WITH THE OPERATING SYSTEM (134), AND THUS PREVENTS DIVULGENCE OF THE SYSTEM KEY (204) UNDER INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES. AFTER A PORTION OF THE MACHINE STARTUP PROCEDURE HAS OCCURRED, THE OPERATING SYSTEM LOADER (410) IS RUN, THE LOADER IS VALIDATED, AND A CORRECT MACHINE STATE IS EITHER VERIFIED TO EXIST AND/OR CREATED. ONCE THE LOADER HAS BEEN VERIFIED TO BE A LEGITIMATE LOADER, AND THE MACHINE STATE UNDER WHICH IT IS RUNNING IS VERIFIED TO BE CORRECT, THE LOADER'S FUTURE BEHAVIOR IS KNOWN TO PROTECT AGAINST THE LOADING OF ROGUE COMPONENTS THAT COULD CAUSE DIVULGENCE OF THE SYSTEM KEY (204). WITH THE LOADER'S BEHAVIOR BEING KNOWN TO BE SAFE FOR THE SYSTEM KEY(204), THE VALIDATOR (550) MAY UNSEAL THE SYSTEM KEY AND PROVIDES IT TO THE LOADER.
Abstract:
A mechanism for protected operating system boot that prevents rogue components from being loaded with the operating system, and thus prevents divulgence of the system key under inappropriate circumstances. After a portion of the machine startup procedure has occurred, the operating system loader is run, the loader is validated, and a correct machine state is either verified to exist and/or created. Once the loader has been verified to be a legitimate loader, and the machine state under which it is running is verified to be correct, the loader's future behavior is known to protect against the loading of rogue components that could cause divulgence of the system key With the loader's behavior being known to be safe for the system key, the validator may unseal the system key and provides it to the loader.