Abstract:
Authentication is performed to a confidence level (CL) desired by a verifier (220). A prover (210) picks and sends certain same size, square matrices to the verifier (220). A random request bit is sent (234) from the verifier (220) to the prover (210) after the receipt of a certain square matrix. Depending on the request bit, calculations are made (244, 264) by the verifier (220) to determine if the matrices sent from the prover are verifiable. The prover (210) is iteratively authenticated by the verifier (220). Iterations are continued until (320) a count of the iterations (IL) reaches a number sufficient to achieve the desired confidence level (CL). After a delay, more iterations can achieve a higher confidence level by building on previous result of authentication without having to begin at zero. During this delay, the verifier (220) can perform tasks in reliance on the result of authentication.
Abstract:
A vehicle (100) accesses a secure device having limited accessibility but being accessible by a service technician. The secure device stores a first cryptographic key associated with the service technician. The vehicle (100) also obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic technician is associated with a second cryptographic key corresponding to the first cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the second cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic technician. The vehicle (100) utilizes the second cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the secure device, and determines whether the service technician is the authentic technician based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the service technician is the authentic technician, the vehicle (100) may allow the prospective component to become operative within the vehicle (100).
Abstract:
A vehicle maintains a record of configuration elements, such as components for use in the vehicle, of the configuration of the vehicle. The vehicle also maintains a history of configuration functions for each of the configuration elements. The history may include a type of each configuration function, such as installation of a configuration element into the vehicle, and may also include a record of corresponding times at which the configuration functions have occurred, which can be utilized to determine a configuration of the vehicle at a time of an event. Additionally or alternatively, the vehicle may maintain a service history of at least one service technician performing a service operation with respect to a corresponding one of the configuration elements. The service history may include a type of each service operation, and may also include a record of a corresponding time at which the service technician performed the service operation, which may be utilized to determine a service technician having most recently performed a service operation at a time of an event.
Abstract:
Devices (101) are assigned a unique, unalterable, identification or serial number (313) that acts as the devices "electronic" biometric. Any certificate (302) created by a key issuer will contain the device's assigned DRM public key and the device's electronic biometric data. When a consumer wishes to purchase new content (304) from a content provider (103), the consumer will send the DRM certificate containing its DRM public key and the biometric. The rights issuer will then create a license (306) that assigns the content in such a way that only a device with the particular biometric and DRM private key is allowed to render the content.
Abstract:
A vehicle accesses a secure device having limited accessibility but being accessible by a service technician. The secure device stores a first cryptographic key associated with the service technician. The vehicle also obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic technician is associated with a second cryptographic key corresponding to the first cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the second cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic technician. The vehicle utilizes the second cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the secure device, and determines whether the service technician is the authentic technician based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the service technician is the authentic technician, the vehicle may allow the prospective component to become operative within the vehicle.
Abstract:
A vehicle authenticates a first prospective component by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key unique to the first prospective component and determining whether the first prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in cryptographic communication with the first prospective component. The vehicle authenticates a component class of a second prospective component by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component of the component class is associated with a second cryptographic key unique to the component class and determining whether the second prospective component is an authentic component of the component class based on whether the second cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication with the second prospective component.
Abstract:
New devices (101) are added to an existing domain by obtaining domain information (e.g., domain name and private domain password) from devices (101) already in the domain that preferably are in close proximity. Once the domain information has been transferred from the device already in the domain to the device being added to the domain, the device being added to the domain contacts a key issuer (105) to complete its registration into the domain. The key issuer returns a DRM domain private key (206) as well as a DRM certificate (202). Both are utilized by the device to obtain and render digital content (204).
Abstract:
A system and method to securely create, distribute, install and execute selected features of software on wireless devices combines three different types of licenses, a validation license, a digital rights management (DRM) license, and a feature license with a software application. Each of these three licenses work independent of each other, where the validation license helps prevent malicious code from executing on wireless devices, the DRM license prevents unauthorized copying of the software application and the feature license securely enables or disables specific features of the software application. The system also allows a wireless device to unwrap a DRM protected software application, to validate the software application, to enforce DRM usage rules and to execute selected features of the software application.