Abstract:
An encryption apparatus (200) comprises an elapsed time processor (205) which determines an elapsed time from a transmission of a previous encryption synchronisation message such as a synchronisation initialisation value. Encryption synchronisation messages are transmitted by replacing user data transmissions, e.g. by slot stealing. A priority processor (207) determines a first priority of the current user data transmission and a time threshold function (209) provides a corresponding first time. A transmit unit (201) transmits a new encryption synchronisation message when the elapsed time exceeds the first time threshold. The apparatus (200) further comprises a function controller (211) which is operable to modify the function between the first priority and the first time threshold during the call. The invention is particularly applicable to TETRA and may provide a dynamic trade-off between the speed of encryption re-synchronisation and late entry and the audio quality degradation.
Abstract:
In a cellular communication system (eg. TETRA), a receiver can continue to decrypt signals despite checksum errors arising from synchronisation verification failures on behalf of transmitters which do not use real time clocks to calculate the checksum. Synchronisation verification values are transmitted via half-slot stealing and verified according to a local time base, and a fall back mode is entered if the verification value is invalid which allows continued communication, perhaps with a warning that it may comprise a replay attack. Synchronisation may proceed on the basis of previously received parameters (eg a flywheel process). This method allows flexible interoperability in mixed groups of transceivers, some of which incorporate real time clocks and some of which don't. Such failures or errors would usually terminate the communication to protect against replay attacks.
Abstract:
An encryption apparatus (200) comprises an elapsed time processor (205) which determines an elapsed time from a transmission of a previous encryption synchronisation message such as a synchronisation initialisation value. Encryption synchronisation messages are transmitted by replacing user data transmissions, e.g. by slot stealing. A priority processor (207) determines a first priority of the current user data transmission and a time threshold function (209) provides a corresponding first time. A transmit unit (201) transmits a new encryption synchronisation message when the elapsed time exceeds the first time threshold. The apparatus (200) further comprises a function controller (211) which is operable to modify the function between the first priority and the first time threshold during the call. The invention is particularly applicable to TETRA and may provide a dynamic trade-off between the speed of encryption re-synchronisation and late entry and the audio quality degradation.
Abstract:
An encryption apparatus (200) comprises an elapsed time processor (205) which determines an elapsed time from a transmission of a previous encryption synchronisation message such as a synchronisation initialisation value. Encryption synchronisation messages are transmitted by replacing user data transmissions, e.g. by slot stealing. A priority processor (207) determines a first priority of the current user data transmission and a time threshold function (209) provides a corresponding first time. A transmit unit (201) transmits a new encryption synchronisation message when the elapsed time exceeds the first time threshold. The apparatus (200) further comprises a function controller (211) which is operable to modify the function between the first priority and the first time threshold during the call. The invention is particularly applicable to TETRA and may provide a dynamic trade-off between the speed of encryption re-synchronisation and late entry and the audio quality degradation.
Abstract:
A single-chip integrated circuit (100) comprising a first processor (103) for executing a plurality of applications, a second processor (104) for executing a plurality of applications, at least one of a) at least one embedded peripheral (105) and b) at least one memory (106), and a bus monitor (102) for allowing access to the at least one of a) the at least one embedded peripheral (105) and the at least one memory (106), if the access is allowed, wherein the bus monitor (102) comprises a mapping of access rights to the least one of a) the at least one embedded peripheral (105) and b) the at least one memory (106) for the first processor (103) and the second processor (104) is disclosed.
Abstract:
A system and method of providing secure communications is provided. Messages are encrypted or decrypted in protected memory of a processor. Outbound messages from a secure network are prepared for encryption by adding a header outside of the protected memory and then encrypted in the protected memory. The encryption is performed by retrieving a key from a key cache as designated by rules in the header. The encrypted message is sent to the unsecure network. An inbound message from an unsecure network that is received in unprotected memory is sent to a decryption module in protected memory. The inbound message is decrypted using a key designated in its header and retrieved from the key cache. The decrypted message is returned to the unprotected memory, where it is stripped of the encryption header and then sent to its destination within the secure network.
Abstract:
A method for securely exchanging public key certificates in an electronic device (400) using a single or dual level of public key includes obtaining a replacement public key certificate (401) to replace an original public key certificate. The replacement public key certificate is signed (403) using the private key of the original public key certificate. The signature of the original public key certificate is validated (407) and the replacement public key certificate is written to memory where the original public key certificate cannot again be used as a default. Thus, the method of the invention uses either a single signature or combination of double signatures to permit transfer of signing authority to an independent third party. Once the original secondary public key is overwritten, the manufacturer's original secondary public key may no longer be used and the process is irreversible.