Abstract:
Systems and methods are disclosed for securing an enterprise environment by detecting suspicious software. A global program lineage graph is constructed. Construction of the global program lineage graph includes creating a node for each version of a program having been installed on a set of user machines. Additionally, at least two nodes are linked with a directional edge. For each version of the program, a prevalence number of the set of user machines on which each version of the program had been installed is determined; and the prevalence number is recorded to the metadata associated with the respective node. Anomalous behavior is identified based on structures formed by the at least two nodes and associated directional edge in the global program lineage graph. An alarm is displayed on a graphical user interface for each suspicious software based on the identified anomalous behavior.
Abstract:
Systems and methods for data reduction including organizing (701) data of an event stream into a file access table concurrently with receiving the event stream, the data including independent features and dependent features. A frequent pattern tree (FP-Tree) is built (702) including nodes corresponding to the dependent features according to a frequency of occurrence of the dependent features relative to the independent features. Each single path in the FP-Tree is merged (703) into a special node corresponding to segments of dependent features to produce a reduced FP-Tree. All path combinations in the reduced FP-Tree are identified (704). A compressible file access template (CFAT) is generated (705) corresponding to each of the path combinations. The data of the event stream is compressed (706) with the CFATs to reduce the dependent features to special events representing the dependent features.
Abstract:
Methods and systems for reporting anomalous events include intra-host clustering a set of alerts based on a process graph that models states of process-level events in a network. Hidden relationship clustering is performed on the intra-host clustered alerts based on hidden relationships between alerts in respective clusters. Inter-host clustering is performed on the hidden relationship clustered alerts based on a topology graph that models source and destination relationships between connection events in the network. Inter-host clustered alerts that exceed a threshold level of trustworthiness are reported.
Abstract:
Methods and systems for process constraint include collecting system call information for a process. It is detected whether the process is idle based on the system call information and then whether the process is repeating using autocorrelation to determine whether the process issues system calls in a periodic fashion. The process is constrained if it is idle or repeating the limit an attack surface presented by the process.
Abstract:
Systems and methods for implementing a system architecture to support a trusted execution environment (TEE) with computational acceleration are provided. The method includes establishing a first trusted channel between a user application stored on an enclave and a graphics processing unit (GPU) driver loaded on a hypervisor (640). Establishing the first trusted channel includes leveraging page permissions in an extended page table (EPT) to isolate the first trusted channel between the enclave and the GPU driver in a physical memory of an operating system (OS). The method further includes establishing a second trusted channel between the GPU driver and a GPU device (650). The method also includes launching a unified TEE that includes the enclave and the hypervisor with execution of application code of the user application (660).
Abstract:
A method and system are provided for improving threat detection in a computer system by performing an inter-application dependency analysis on events of the computer system. The method includes receiving, by a processor operatively coupled to a memory, a Tracking Description Language (TDL) query including general constraints, a tracking declaration and an output specification, parsing, by the processor, the TDL query using a language parser, executing, by the processor, a tracking analysis based on the parsed TDL query, generating, by the processor, a tracking graph by cleaning a result of the tracking analysis, and outputting, by the processor and via an interface, query results based on the tracking graph.
Abstract:
Methods for querying a database and database systems include optimizing (304) a database query for parallel execution using spatial and temporal information relating to elements in the database, the optimized database query being split into sub-queries with sub-queries being divided spatially according to host and temporally according to time window. The sub-queries are executed (306) in parallel. The results of the database query are outputted (310) progressively.
Abstract:
Systems and methods for identifying similarities in program binaries, including extracting program binary features from one or more input program binaries to generate corresponding hybrid features. The hybrid features include a reference feature, a resource feature, an abstract control flow feature, and a structural feature. Combinations of a plurality of pairs of binaries are generated from the extracted hybrid features, and a similarity score is determined for each of the pairs of binaries. A hybrid difference score is generated based on the similarity score for each of the binaries combined with input hybrid feature parameters. A likelihood of malware in the input program is identified based on the hybrid difference score.
Abstract:
Methods and systems for intrusion attack recovery include monitoring (502) two or more hosts in a network to generate audit logs of system events. One or more dependency graphs (DGraphs) is generated (504) based on the audit logs. A relevancy score for each edge of the DGraphs is determined (510). Irrelevant events from the DGraphs are pruned (510) to generate a condensed backtracking graph. An origin is located by backtracking (512) from an attack detection point in the condensed backtracking graph.
Abstract:
A method for implementing confidential machine learning with program compartmentalization includes implementing a development stage to design an ML program (510), including annotating source code of the ML program to generate an ML program annotation, performing program analysis based on the development stage (520), including compiling the source code of the ML program based on the ML program annotation, inserting binary code based on the program analysis (530), including inserting run-time code into a confidential part of the ML program and a non-confidential part of the ML program, and generating an ML model by executing the ML program with the inserted binary code to protect the confidentiality of the ML model and the ML program from attack (542).