Abstract:
In a communication system in which two communication entities seek to have a private or confidential communication session, a trust relationship needs first be established. The trust relationship is based on the determination of a shared secret which in turn is generated from contextual information. The contextual information can be derived from the circumstances surrounding the communication session. For example, the contextual information can include topological information, time-based information, and transactional information. The shared secret may be self-generated or received from a third party. In either event, the shared secret may be used as key material for any cryptographic protocol used between the communication entities.
Abstract:
Se describen un metodo y aparato para la generacion segura de una clave de corto plazo (SK) para visualizar el contenido de informacion en un sistema de Multiemision-emision-multimedios. Una clave de corto plazo es generada por un modulo de memoria que reside en el equipo de usuario (UE) solamente cuando puede validarse la fuente de la informacion utilizada para generar la clave de corto plazo. Puede generarse una clave de corto plazo por una Clave de Acceso de Emision (BAK) o un derivado de una BAK y un valor cambiante con un Codigo de Autenticacion de Mensajes (MAC) anexo al valor cambiante. Tambien puede generarse una clave de corto plazo (SK) utilizando una clave privada y un administrador de claves de corto plazo (SK) con una clave publica correspondiente distribuida en el modulo de memoria que reside en el equipo de usuario (UE), utilizando una firma digital.
Abstract:
A method and an apparatus for secure registration for a multicast-broadcast- multimedia system (MBMS) are disclosed. A random number is generated by a broadcast-multicast-service center (BM-SC) and broadcast to user equipment i n the coverage area of a radio access network (RAN). A memory module or smart card (UICC) in the user equipment generates a radio access network key (RAK) which is a function of the random number and a key selected from the group consisting of a public land mobile network key (PK) and a broadcast access k ey (BAK), and then generates a temporary registration key (RGK) as a function o f the RAK, a service identification number and a user identification number, f or example, P-TMSI, which may be extracted by the RAN to authenticate the registration as legitimate.
Abstract:
Method and apparatus for secure transmissions. Each user is provided a registration key. A long-time updated broadcast key is encrypted using the registration key and provided periodically to a user. A short-time updated key is encrypted using the broadcast key and provided periodically to a user. Broadcasts are then encrypted using the short-time key, wherein the user decrypts the broadcast message using the short-time key. One embodiment provides link layer content encryption. Another embodiment provides end-to-end encryption.
Abstract:
Methods and devices for instructing a subscriber identity module in a cellular communications network to process non-standard authentication information in a standard manner are disclosed. One embodiment of a method comprises receiving a first message authentication code (MAC) and an authentication management field (AMF) at a subscriber identity module as part of an authentication protocol, calculating a second MAC and determining whether the second MAC is equivalent to the first MAC. If the first and second MAC are not equivalent, the SIM calculates a third MAC and determines whether the first MAC is equivalent to the third MAC, and if so, the subscriber identity module processes the AMF in a predefined or standard manner.
Abstract:
Apparatus and method for provisioning an access key used for a controlled access broadcast service is disclosed. In one aspect, a method for secure processing in a device that securely stores a secret key comprises receiving a plurality of challenges from a network, generating a plurality of ciphering keys based on the secret key and the plurality of challenges, and generating an access key based on the plurality of ciphering keys.
Abstract:
A method and an apparatus for secure registration for a multicast-broadcast-multimedia system (MBMS) are disclosed. A random number is generated by a broadcast-multicast-service center (BM-SC) and broadcast to user equipment in the coverage area of a radio access network (RAN). A memory module or smart card (UICC) in the user equipment generates a radio access network key (RAK) which is a function of the random number and a key selected from the group consisting of a public land mobile network key (PK) and a broadcast access key (BAK), and then generates a temporary registration key (RGK) as a function of the RAK, a service identification number and a user identification number, for example, P-TMSI, which may be extracted by the RAN to authenticate the registration as legitimate.
Abstract:
Method and apparatus for secure transmissions. Each user is provided a registration key. A long-time updated broadcast key is encrypted using the registration key and provided periodically to a user. A short-time updated key is encrypted using the broadcast key and provided periodically to a user. Broadcasts are then encrypted using the short-time key, wherein the user decrypts the broadcast message using the short-time key. One embodiment provides link layer content encryption. Another embodiment provides end-to-end encryption.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus for protecting user privacy in a shared key system (100). According to one aspect, a user (114) generates a derived identity (108) based on a key (102) and a session variable, and sends the derived identity to an application (116). In one embondiment, a key server (126) may be used to receive the derived identity from the application, and return a sub-key (138) to the application to use for encrypting communications with the user.