Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a method for verifying anonymous payment by defined parties (I, V) in a communication system to provide a public key base. SOLUTION: This method includes (a) a step of receiving an adequacy inspection message including a customer secret key, a customer certificate, at least one customer attribute, a certification signature taken from a coded payment message, and generated by a customer party, and the coded payment message from a retailer party, (b) a step of verifying the adequacy of the certification signature based on an issuance public key, a verification public key, and the coded payment message, (c) a step of decoding at least part of the coded payment message based on a verification secret key corresponding to the verification public key, and obtain customer information related to at least one customer attribute, and a step of using the obtained customer information to initially set the permission of payment when the certification signature is adequate. COPYRIGHT: (C)2004,JPO
Abstract:
A method, a system and a computer program for changing an encryption key of data encrypted by a first key and stored on an archive server (40), wherein a conversion is applied to the data, generating recrypted data decryptable by means of a second key, the conversion being generated on a second server (30) and associated with the first key and the second key via a functional operation and transferred from the second server (30) to the archive server (40) via a transfer channel (38).
Abstract:
The presented methods form the basis of a forward-secure signature scheme that is provably secure. Moreover, the presented methods form also the basis of a fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme that is secure and efficient. The scheme allows to react immediately on hacker break-ins such that signatures from the past still remain valid without re-issuing them and future signature values based on an exposed key can be identified accordingly. In general, each prepared signature carries an ascending index such that once an index is used, no lower index can be used to sign. Then, whenever an adversary breaks in, an honest signer can just announce the current index, e.g., by signing some special message with respect to the current index, as part of the revocation message for the current time period. It is then understood that all signatures made in prior time periods as well as all signatures make in the revoked period up to the announced index are valid, i.e., non-reputable.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatus are provided for attesting the configuration of a computing platform (1) to a verifier (3). A signature key (SK) is bound to the platform (1) and bound to a defined configuration of the platform (1). A credential (C(SK), CDAA(SK)) for the signature key (SK) is obtained from an evaluator (2). This credential (C(SK), CDAA(SK)) certifies that the signature key (SK) is bound to an unspecified trusted platform configuration. The platform (1) can then demonstrate to the verifier (3) the ability to sign a challenge from the verifier (3) using the signature key (SK), and demonstrate possession of the credential (C(SK), CDAA(SK)) to the verifier (3), thereby attesting that the platform (1) has a trusted configuration without disclosing the platform configuration to the verifier (3). The ability to sign the challenge may be demonstrated by returning the signed challenge to the verifier (3), and possession of the credential may similarly be demonstrated by sending the credential C(SK) to the verifier (3). Alternatively, the credential may be an anonymous credential CDAA(SK) bound to a public key of the signature key (SK). In this case, possession of the credential CDAA(SK), and the ability to sign the challenge, can be demonstrated without actually disclosing the credential or the public key of the signature key (SK) to the verifier (3). Corresponding methods and apparatus relating to operation of an evaluator (2) and verifier (3) in the attestation process are also provided.
Abstract:
The invention relates to a method for providing an assertion message (200) from a proving party (20) to a relying party (40), the method comprising the steps of: - creating an assertion (A) comprising one or more statements, - creating an assertion proof (p A), - creating a temporary private key and a corresponding temporary public key (K) from the assertion (A) and the assertion proof (p A), - creating a key proof (PK) for the temporary public key (K), - creating an assertion message signature (S) by means of the temporary private key, - creating the assertion message (200) comprising the temporary public key (K), the assertion proof (PA), the key proof (PK), the assertion (A), a message body (220) and the assertion message signature (S) to the relying party (40).
Abstract:
The present invention discloses a method for generating and verifying a user attestation-signature value (DAA') and issuing an attestation value (cert) for the generation of the user attestation-signature value (DAA'). Further, the invention is related to a system for using a user attestation-signature value (DAA') that corresponds to at least one attribute (A, B, C, D), each with an attribute value (w, x, y, z), none, one or more of the attribute values (x, y) remaining anonymous for transactions, the system comprising: a user device (20) having a security module (22) that provides a module public key (PKTPM) and a security module attestation value (DAA), the user device (20) providing a user public key (PKUC) that inherently comprises none, one, or more user determined attribute value (x, y) and a proof value demonstrating that the user public key (PKUC) is validly derived from the module public key (PKTPM) of the security module (22); an attester computer (30) that provides none, one, or more attester determined attribute value (w, z) and an attestation value (cert) that bases on an attester secret key (SKAC), the user public key (PKUC), and an anonymous attribute value (w, z); and a verification computer (40) for verifying whether or not (i) the user attestation-signature value (DAA') was validly derived from the security module attestation value (DAA) provided by the security module (22) and the attestation value (cert), and (ii) the attestation value (cert) is associated with a subset (B, D) of at least one attribute, each attribute in the subset (B, D) having a revealed attribute value (x, z).
Abstract:
Es werden Verfahren zum Herstellen eines authentifizierten verpackten Produkts bereitgestellt. Das Verfahren umfasst ein Bereitstellen eines Sicherheitscodes auf dem Produkt, der Sicherheitsdaten für das Produkt codiert, ein Verpacken des Produkts in einer Verpackung und ein Bereitstellen eines Etiketts, das verschlüsselte Produktdaten enthält, auf der Verpackung. Die Produktdaten weisen die Sicherheitsdaten für das Produkt auf. Das Verfahren weist darüber hinaus ein Speichern eines Entschlüsselungsschlüssels für die verschlüsselten Produktdaten auf einem Netzwerkserver und ein Bereitstellen von Zugriffsdaten auf der Verpackung zum Zugreifen auf den Entschlüsselungsschlüssel auf dem Netzwerkserver auf. Es werden entsprechende Verfahren und Systeme zum Überprüfen der Echtheit eines derartigen authentifizierten verpackten Produkts bereitgestellt.
Abstract:
The invention provides a method and system for processing securely an originator request of a customer. This originator request can be sent to at least one first entity. The method for processing the originator request comprises the steps of a) sending from the customer the originator request t o the or each first entity; b) connecting the or each first entity to a computation entity; c) adding by the or each first entity, on receipt of the originator request, information concerning the originator request thereby forming a first-modified request; d) sending at least part of the first modified request to at least the computation entity; e) having received at least part of the first-modified request by the computation entity deriving a computation-entity result from the atleast part of the first-modified reques t; f) sending at least part of the computation-entity result to the or each fir st entity; g) having received at least part of the computation-entity result by the or each first entity deriving therefrom a first-entity ressult and forwarding it at least in part; and h) having received at least part of the first-entity result by the customer deriving therefrom a customer result.
Abstract:
The invention relates to a computer implemented method, a computer system and a computer program for privacy enhanced comparison of a plurality of data sets. The method comprises the steps of: - allocating a private encryption key to each of the data sets, - an encryption step being performed for each of the data sets, the encryption step comprising generating a commutatively encrypted data set of the respective data set, wherein the commutatively encrypted data sets are generated by successively applying a keyed commutative encryption function on the respective data set with the private encryption key of the respective data set itself and with the private encryption keys of the other data sets, - comparing the commutatively encrypted data sets.
Abstract:
The present invention discloses a method and system for maintaining privacy for transactions performable by a user device having a security module with a privacy certification authority and a verifier. The system comprises an issuer providing an issuer public key PKI; a user device having a security module for generating a first set of attestation-signature values DAA1; a privacy certification authority computer for providing an authority public key PKPCA and issuing second attestation values AV2; and a verification computer for checking the validity of the first set of attestation-signature values DAA1 with the issuer public key PKI and the validity of a second set of attestation-signature values DAA2 with the authority public key PKPCA, the second set of attestation-signature values DAA2 being derivable by the user device 20 from the second attestation values AV2, wherein it is verifiable that the two sets of attestation-signature values DAA1, DAA2 relate to the user device.