Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To start a reliable environment in a system. SOLUTION: In one embodiment, this method include steps for: authenticating a start logic processor of the system; evaluating a reliable agent by the start logic processor when the start logic processor is authenticated; and starting the reliable agent by a plurality of processors of the system when the reliable agent is evaluated. In a prescribed embodiment, after the execution of the reliable agent, a secure kernel can be started. For example, the system can be a multiprocessor server system having partially or perfectly connected topology having arbitrary point-to-point interconnection. COPYRIGHT: (C)2006,JPO&NCIPI
Abstract:
PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To solve the problem that conventional PCR bindings can yield very rigid protection of data, where any change to the software that executes on the system results in the inability to access the data. SOLUTION: This disclosure describes methods for using the TPM's configuration binding capabilities to lock data to a configuration in a manner that is flexible enough to allow the software in that configuration to be upgraded, under a trusted upgrade service, without causing the processing system to lose access to the data. Additionally, a processing system can provide for recovery of data when the processing system is no longer able to get into the predefined safe and approved configuration, e.g., recovery from a failed upgrade is allowed. COPYRIGHT: (C)2009,JPO&INPIT
Abstract:
In one embodiment of the present invention, a method includes verifying an initiating logical processor of a system; validating a trusted agent with the initiating logical processor if the initiating logical processor is verified; and launching the trusted agent on a plurality of processors of the system if the trusted agent is validated. After execution of such a trusted agent, a secure kernel may then be launched, in certain embodiments. The system may be a multiprocessor server system having a partially or fully connected topology with arbitrary point-to-point interconnects, for example.
Abstract:
An apparatus and method are described for implementing a trusted dynamic launch and trusted platform module (TPM) using a secure enclave. For example, a computer-implemented method according to one embodiment of the invention comprises: initializing a secure enclave in response to a first command, the secure enclave comprising a trusted software execution environment which prevents software executing outside the enclave from having access to software and data inside the enclave; and executing a trusted platform module (TPM) from within the secure enclave, the trusted platform module securely reading data from a set of platform control registers (PCR) in a processor or chipset component into a memory region allocated to the secure enclave.
Abstract:
In one embodiment, a processor can enforce a blacklist and validate, according to a multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol, a device coupled to the processor. Such enforcement may prevent the device from accessing one or more resources of a system prior to the validation. The blacklist may include a list of devices that have not been validated according to the multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
A processing system with a trusted platform module (TPM) supports migration of digital keys. For instance, an application in the processing system may create a first configuration key as a child of a TPM storage root key (SRK) when the processing system has a first configuration. The application may also create an upgradable root user key associated with an upgrade authority as a child of the first configuration key. The application may also create a user key as a child of the upgradable root user key. When the processing system has a second configuration, the application may create a second configuration key as a child of the SRK. The application may request migration approval from the upgrade authority. In response to receiving the approval from the upgrade authority, the application may migrate the root user key to be a child of the second configuration key. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
Verfahren zum Starten eines sicheren Kernels in einem System mit einer teilweise oder einer vollständig verbundenen Topologie, das System eine Mehrzahl von Knoten aufweist und jeder Knoten eine Mehrzahl von Prozessoren enthält; umfassend Laden eines Trusted Agents und eines sicheren Kernels in eine sichere Speichereinrichtung, die in dem System vorgesehen ist, wobei die sichere Speichereinrichtung für jeden der Knoten zugänglich ist, und Initiieren eines sicheren Starts auf einem bestimmten Prozessor, der in einem bestimmten Knoten enthalten ist, Konstruieren eines Spannbaums durch den bestimmten Prozessor, wobei der Spannbaum alle anderen Knoten des Systems in Bezug auf den bestimmten Knoten in einer Mehrzahl von Stufen einer Baumstruktur identifiziert; Senden einer sicheren Startmeldung an den anderen Knoten, der in dem Spannbaum identifiziert ist, durch den bestimmten Prozessor; als Antwort auf die sichere Startmeldung von dem anderen Knoten Validieren des in die sichere Speichereinrichtung geladenen Trusted Agents durch den bestimmten...