Cryptographic architecture with instruction masking for thwarting differential power analysis

    公开(公告)号:GB2447795A

    公开(公告)日:2008-09-24

    申请号:GB0807135

    申请日:2005-06-07

    Applicant: HRL LAB LLC

    Abstract: The invention prevents information leakage attacks that utilise timeline alignment such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA). A random or predetermined number of pseudo instructions are inserted into an encryption algorithm such that the leaked information cannot be aligned in time to allow an attacker to break the encryption. The pseudo instructions mimic real instructions in terms of energy consumption without affecting the running of the encryption algorithm. The algorithm may be a Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm and the pseudo instructions may emulate bit-wise shift instructions. The pseudo instructions may be inserted in substitution/permutation box entry address evaluations. The pseudo instructions may be performed when a control flag is set, the control flag halting a state machine of a processor running the encryption algorithm. The halting of the state machine may comprise disabling a destination register of the state machine. Other embodiments are disclosed, including a cryptographic bus architecture that prevents usage of side channel information by randomly toggling the polarity of a target bit at a data bus driver.

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