Abstract:
An integrated circuit structure for MOS-type devices comprising a silicon substrate of a first conductivity type; a first gate insulating regions selectivelyplaced over the silicon substrate of the first conductivity type; a first polycrystallinesilicon layer selectively placed over the silicon substrate of the first conductivity type;a second gate insulating regions selectively placed over the first gate insulating regionsand the first polycrystalline silicon layer; a second polycrystalline silicon layer selectivelyplaced over the second gate insulating regions; first buried silicon regions of a second conductivity type, buried within the silicon substrate of the first conductivity type, placedunder the first polycrystalline silicon layer and in contact therewith; and second buriedsilicon regions of the second conductivity type, buried within the silicon substrate of the first conductivity type, placed under the second gate insulating regions, under the secondpolycrystalline silicon layer and insulated therefrom.
Abstract:
A device adapted to protect integrated circuits from reverse engineering comprising a part looking like a via connecting two metal layers, but in fact attached only to one metal layer and spaced from the other. Having such "trick" via would force a reverse engineer to think there is a connection where there is none. A method for fabricating such device.
Abstract:
A technique for and structures for camouflaging an integrated circuit structure. The integrated circuit structure is formed having a well of a first conductivity type under the gate region being disposed adjacent to active regions of a first conductivity type. The well forming an electrical path between the active regions regardless of any reasonable voltage applied to the integrated circuit structure.
Abstract:
Semiconducting devices, including integrated circuits, are protected from reverse engineering by passivation openings made in a passivation layer. When a reverse engineeretches away the passivation layer and typically the first metal layer, underlying metallayers and/or other elements of the device are destroyed making the reverse engineeringall the more difficult. A method for fabricating such devices is also disclosed.
Abstract:
A cryptographic bus architecture prevents usage of side channel information by Differential Power Attacks (DPA) by randomly toggling the polarity of an encrypted bit at a data bus driver. The bus architecture comprises bi-directional drivers 315, 317 connected by a bus 316. An N-bit random number generator 313 has N outputs 314, wherein each output comprises one bit. The value of each random bit is used to toggle a driver, i.e. change its polarity, and drive the internal bus so as to defeat correlation. The chance of having a "0" or "1" will be approximately 0.5 due to the randomization of the polarity. Preferably the polarity control line is probe-resistant. The bus may have dual rails for parallel transmission of each bit, with one rail being inverted compared to the other rail to mask power consumption (fig. 14). Other embodiments are disclosed for preventing information leakage attacks that utilise timeline alignment, including inserting a random number of instructions into an encryption algorithm such that the leaked information cannot be aligned in time to allow attacker to break the encryption.
Abstract:
A technique for and structures for camouflaging an integrated circuit structure. The integrated circuit structure is formed by a plurality of layers of material having a controlled outline. A layer of conductive material having a controlled outline is disposed among said plurality of layers to provide artifact edges of the conductive material that resemble one type of transistor (operable vs. non-operable), when in fact another type of transistor was used.
Abstract:
A method and circuit for blocking unauthorized access to at least one memory cell in a semiconductor memory. The method includes providing a switch and/or a link which assumes an open state when access to the at least one memory cell is to be blocked; and coupling-a data line associated with the at least one memory cell to a constant voltage source in response to the switch or link assuming an open state.
Abstract:
A multilayered integrated circuit and a method of designing a multilayered integrated circuit are provided. The circuit comprises at least two conductive layers and extraneous conductive lines placed in the conductive layers. The extraneous conductive lines are made of a material which is the same as the material in the conductive layers and have dimensions which are the same as the dimension of the material in the conductive layers. The extraneous conductive lines perform functions which are unnecessary to the operation of the integrated circuit and are undistinguishable from the functional conductive lines, thus burdening the work of a reverse engineer. The method of designing the multilayered circuit comprises a step of providing a computer generated representation of the extraneous conductive lines.
Abstract:
A technique for and structures for camouflaging an integrated circuit structure and strengthen its resistance to reverse engineering. A plurality of transistors are formed in a semiconductor substrate, at least some of the transistors being of the type having sidewall spacers with LDD regions formed under the sidewall spacers. Transistors are programmably interconnected with ambiguous interconnection features, the ambiguous interconnection features each comprising a channel formed in the semiconductor substrate with preferably the same dopant density as the LDD regions, with selected ones of the channels being formed of a conductivity type supporting electrical communication between interconnected active regions and with other selected ones of the channels being formed of a conductivity type inhibiting electrical communication but ambiguously appearing to a reverse engineer as supporting electrical communication.