Abstract:
A method for generating a signed manifest includes referencing an object. A metadata name is recorded. A digest algorithm is recorded. An integrity value that belongs to the object that corresponds to the metadata subject name is digested with the digest algorithm.
Abstract:
Methods and apparatuses associated with sharing cryptographic keys in a network domain. An embedded agent on a network endpoint participates in the distribution of cryptographic keys. In one embodiment the embedded agent receives and stores a shared symmetric key, as do embedded agents on other network endpoints in the same network domain. The embedded agent causes the shared key to be stored in a secure storage not directly accessible by the host. When the host wants to transmit enciphered data, the embedded agent may provide access to cryptographic services. The embedded agent provides isolation of the shared key from parts of the host that are subject to compromise by attack or infection.
Abstract:
Eine sichere Enklavenschaltung speichert eine Enklave-Page-Cache-Map, um Inhalte einer sicheren Enklave in Systemspeicher zu verfolgen, der sichere Daten speichert, die eine Seite mit einer virtuellen Adresse umfassen. Eine Ausführungseinheit soll, als Reaktion auf eine Anforderung, die Seite von der sicheren Enklave zu räumen: die Erzeugung von Übersetzungen der virtuellen Adresse blocken; einen oder mehrere aktuell auf die sicheren Daten in der sicheren Enklave zugreifende Hardware-Threads aufzeichnen; einen Inter-Processor-Interrupt an einen oder mehrere dem einen oder den mehreren Hardware-Threads zugeordnete Kerne senden, um den einen oder die mehreren Hardware-Threads dazu zu veranlassen, die sichere Enklave zu verlassen und Translation-Lookaside-Buffer des einen oder der mehreren Kerne zu leeren; und als Reaktion auf das Erkennen eines der virtuellen Adresse für die Seite in der sicheren Enklave zugeordneten Seitenfehlers, die Erzeugung von Übersetzungen der virtuellen Adresse freigeben.
Abstract:
A method and apparatus for memory encryption with reduced decryption latency. In one embodiment, the method includes reading an encrypted data block from memory. During reading of the encrypted data block, a keystream used to encrypt the data block is regenerated according to one or more stored criteria of the encrypted data block. Once the encrypted data block is read, the encrypted data block is decrypted using the regenerated keystream. Accordingly, in one embodiment, encryption of either random access memory (RAM) or disk memory is performed. A keystream is regenerated during data retrieval such that once the data is received, the data may be decrypted using a single clock operation. As a result, memory encryption is performed without exacerbating memory latency between the processor and memory.
Abstract:
Embodiments of apparatuses and methods including virtual address memory range registers are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes a memory interface, address translation hardware, and virtual memory address comparison hardware. The memory interface is to access a system memory using a physical memory address. The address translation hardware is to support translation of a virtual memory address to the physical memory address. The virtual memory address is used by software to access a virtual memory location in the virtual memory address space of the processor. The virtual memory address comparison hardware is to determine whether the virtual memory address is within a virtual memory address range.
Abstract:
Un procesador (200) que comprende: una unidad de instrucción (214) para recibir una primera instrucción, en donde la primera instrucción es inicializar un enclave seguro, y en donde la primera instrucción también incluye establecer un bit de atributo específico de funcionalidad para el enclave seguro; y una unidad de ejecución (270) para ejecutar la primera instrucción, en donde la ejecución de la primera instrucción incluye verificar que una clave de estructura de firma coincida con una clave digital (216) incorporada en el procesador para permitir que el software que se ejecuta dentro del enclave seguro utilice software o hardware para realizar una función fuera del enclave seguro; y en donde la unidad de instrucción (214) sirve también para recibir una segunda instrucción desde dentro del enclave seguro, y la unidad de ejecución (270) sirve para ejecutar la segunda instrucción, en donde la ejecución de la segunda instrucción incluye proporcionar una clave específica de funcionalidad si se activa el bit de atributo específico de funcionalidad.
Abstract:
Un procedimiento de operación de un sistema (20) de procesamiento que comprende un procesador (22) y unmódulo físico (30) de plataforma de confianza acoplado en comunicación con el procesador, comprendiendo elprocedimiento:a) ejecutar una máquina virtual (110) en el procesador;b) ejecutar en el procesador un servicio (104) que usa el módulo físico de plataforma de confianza para crearpara la máquina virtual un módulo virtual (120) de plataforma de confianza en una memoria protegida delsistema (20) de procesamiento que tiene registros (92) de configuración de la plataforma virtual en unespacio de memoria del módulo virtual de plataforma de confianza;c) almacenar una clave (68, 70, 72) para el módulo virtual de plataforma de confianza en el módulo físico deplataforma de confianza;d) operar el módulo virtual de plataforma de confianza para proporcionar a la máquina virtual característicasemuladas del módulo de plataforma de confianza basadas en valores almacenados en los registros deconfiguración de la plataforma virtual en el espacio de memoria del módulo virtual de plataforma deconfianza y la clave almacenada en el módulo físico de plataforma de confianza.
Abstract:
A virtual security coprocessor framework supports creation of at least one device model to emulate a predetermined cryptographic coprocessor. In one embodiment, the virtual security coprocessor framework uses a cryptographic coprocessor in a processing system to create an instance of the device model (DM) in the processing system. The DM may be based at least in part on a predetermined device model design. The DM may emulate the predetermined cryptographic coprocessor in accordance with the control logic of the device model design. In one embodiment, the virtual security coprocessor framework uses a physical trusted platform module (TPM) in a processing system to support one or more virtual TPMs (vTPMs) for one or more virtual machines (VMs) in the processing system. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
An electronic apparatus has an embeded firmware agent having instructions for selectively operating in a management mode and an embedded controller agent operating independent of a host operating system and selectively invoking the management mode. A bidirectional agent bus is coupled in between the embedded firmware agent and embedded controller agent to transmit messages between both the agents. Manageability and security operations that can be performed on a host system having these cooperative embedded agents.
Abstract:
Embodiments of an invention for maintaining a secure processing environment across power cycles are disclosed. In one embodiment, a processor includes an instruction unit and an execution unit. The instruction unit is to receive an instruction to evict a root version array page entry from a secure cache. The execution unit is to execute the instruction. Execution of the instruction includes generating a blob to contain information to maintain a secure processing environment across a power cycle and storing the blob in a non-volatile memory.