Abstract:
Bei einigen Ausführungsformen wird eine sichere Berechtigungsanfrage, um eine Hardwarekonfiguration zu ändern, erzeugt. Die sichere Berechtigungsanfrage wird an einen entfernten Standort gesendet und eine Berechtigung, die vom entfernten Standort als Reaktion auf die Berechtigungsanfrage gesendet wird, wird empfangen. Die Hardwarekonfiguration wird als Reaktion auf die empfangene Berechtigung geändert. Weitere Ausführungsformen sind beschrieben und werden beansprucht.
Abstract:
A technique to enable secure application and data integrity within a computer system. In one embodiment, one or more secure enclaves are established in which an application and data may be stored and executed.
Abstract:
Un procesador (200) que comprende: una unidad de instrucción (214) para recibir una primera instrucción, en donde la primera instrucción es inicializar un enclave seguro, y en donde la primera instrucción también incluye establecer un bit de atributo específico de funcionalidad para el enclave seguro; y una unidad de ejecución (270) para ejecutar la primera instrucción, en donde la ejecución de la primera instrucción incluye verificar que una clave de estructura de firma coincida con una clave digital (216) incorporada en el procesador para permitir que el software que se ejecuta dentro del enclave seguro utilice software o hardware para realizar una función fuera del enclave seguro; y en donde la unidad de instrucción (214) sirve también para recibir una segunda instrucción desde dentro del enclave seguro, y la unidad de ejecución (270) sirve para ejecutar la segunda instrucción, en donde la ejecución de la segunda instrucción incluye proporcionar una clave específica de funcionalidad si se activa el bit de atributo específico de funcionalidad.
Abstract:
Verfahren, umfassend:das Erzeugen einer sicheren Berechtigungsanfrage, um eine Hardwarekonfiguration zu ändern;das Senden der sicheren Berechtigungsanfrage zu einem entfernten Standort;das Empfangen einer Berechtigung, die vom entfernten Standort als Reaktion auf die Berechtigungsanfrage gesendet wird;unddas Ändern der Hardwarekonfiguration als Reaktion auf die empfangene Berechtigung;wobei der private Teil eines eindeutigen Schlüssels während der Herstellung der Hardware dauerhaft in der Hardware eingeschlossen wurde und der private Teil verwendet wird, um eine sichere Kommunikation und Berechtigungsauthentifizierung mit dem entfernten Standort sicherzustellen, wobei der private Teil zum Erzeugen einer Signatur auf einem Zeitstempel und einer Nonce verwendet wird, die unter Verwendung des Gruppenteils des eindeutigen Schlüssels verifiziert werden kann, der in einem Serversystem gespeichert ist; undwobei der private Teil des eindeutigen Schlüssels in die Hardware während der Herstellung einzigartig programmiert wird, indem zufällig Sicherungen in der Hardware während der Herstellung durchgebrannt werden.
Abstract:
A technique to enable secure application and data integrity within a computer system. In one embodiment, one or more secure enclaves are established in which an application and data may be stored and executed.
Abstract:
Delivering a Direct Proof private key in a signed group of keys to a device installed in a client computer system in the field may be accomplished in a secure manner without requiring significant non-volatile storage in the device. A unique pseudo-random value is generated and stored along with a group number in the device at manufacturing time. The pseudo-random value is used to generate a symmetric key for encrypting a data structure holding a Direct Proof private key and a private key digest associated with the device. The resulting encrypted data structure is stored in a signed group of keys (e.g., a signed group record) on a removable storage medium (such as a CD or DVD), and distributed to the owner of the client computer system. When the device is initialized on the client computer system, the system checks if a localized encrypted data structure is present in the system. If not, the system obtains the associated signed group record of encrypted data structures from the removable storage medium, and verifies the signed group record. The device decrypts the encrypted data structure using a symmetric key regenerated from its stored pseudo-random value to obtain the Direct Proof private key, when the group record is valid. If the private key is valid, it may be used for subsequent authentication processing by the device in the client computer system.
Abstract:
In some embodiments a secure permit request to change a hardware configuration is created. The secure permit request is sent to a remote location, and a permit sent from the remote location in response to the permit request is received. The hardware configuration is changed in response to the received permit. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Abstract:
Providing trusted time in a computing platform, while still supporting privacy, may be accomplished by having a trusted time device provide the trusted time to an application executing on the computing platform. The trusted time device may be reset by determining if a value in a trusted time random number register has been set, and if not, waiting a period of time, generating a new random number, and storing the new random number in the trusted time random number register. The trusted time random number register is set to zero whenever electrical power is first applied to the trusted time device upon power up of the computing platform, and whenever a battery powering the trusted time device is removed and reconnected. By keeping the size of the trusted time random number register relatively small, and waiting the specified period of time, attacks on the computing platform to determine the trusted time may be minimized, while deterring the computing platform from being uniquely identified.
Abstract:
This application is directed to trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system. In general, TPM certification and TPM attestation may be supported in a device utilizing integrated TPM through the use of anonymous key system (AKS) certification. An example device may comprise at least combined AKS and TPM resources that load AKS and TPM firmware (FW) into a runtime environment that may further include at least an operating system (OS) encryption module, an AKS service module and a TPM Certification and Attestation (CA) module. For TPM certification, the CA module may interact with the other modules in the runtime environment to generate a TPM certificate, signed by an AKS certificate, that may be transmitted to a certification platform for validation. For TPM attestation, the CA module may cause TPM credentials to be provided to the attestation platform for validation along with the TPM and/or AKS certificates.